

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 DRC-01 /149 W

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O R 130936Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 540

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 23

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9342

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: PRESENTATION OF ALLIED THEMES

BELOW IS TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT ON PHASING AND FOCUS  
ON US/SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY IN PLENARY  
MORNING OF NOVEMBER 13. THIS STATEMENT IS ONE OF THE SERIES  
OF DEVELOPMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION LEADING UP TO THE  
PRESENTATION OF A FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BEGIN TEXT:

FOLLOWING ON THE REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR BEHREND, I  
WOULD LIKE ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO CONTINUE  
OUR PRESENTATION OF THE GENERAL PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE  
ARE THE BEST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN EARLIER PRESENTATIONS, MY COLLEAGUES HAVE DESCRIBED  
THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHERLANDS

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REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED THE NEED TO MOVE TOWARD THE AGREED

OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS "TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE," AND TO IMPROVE AND STABILIZE THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA. THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSED THE INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN FLANKS PARTICIPANTS.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE IMPORTANT DESTABILIZING DISPARITIES IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US, GEOGRAPHY AND THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF FORCES. THESE MUST BE DEALT WITH IN ANY AGREEMENT IF STABILITY IS TO BE ENHANCED AND SECURITY STRENGTHENED.

USING THESE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY HAS TODAY BEGUN OUR PRESENTATION OF GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS. HE HAS PROPOSED ON OUR BEHALF A FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND AN AGREEMENT ON A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THIS IS THE BEST AND MOST DIRECT APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE DISPARITY OF MANPOWER AND AN AGREEMENT ON THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE A MOST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ENHANCING STABILITY IN THE AREA.

THE OVERALL SOLUTION WE PROPOSE FOR DEALING WITH THE MANPOWER DISPARITY -- AN AGREED COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, TAKING ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY -- WOULD REQUIRE IMPORTANT REDUCTIONS TOO LARGE TO BE REACHED IN ONE STEP. WE BELIEVE THE INITIAL REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL AND THUS A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN REACHING A COMMON CEILING. IT SHOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH TO BE PERCEIVED AS SIGNIFICANT AND LARGE ENOUGH TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. BUT WE ALSO BELIEVE THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO GO THE WHOLE DISTANCE TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN ONE MOVE.

THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR THIS APPROACH: TOO LARGE A REDUCTION IN A SINGLE STEP COULD PROVE DESTABILIZING. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, PROCEED WITH DUE PRUDENCE. EACH PARTY WILL WISH TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER PROPOSED MEASURES WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ITS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS CAN BE DONE WITH GREATER ASSURANCE WHEN THE MEASURES ARE PHASED SO THAT THEIR EFFECTS CAN

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BE CLEARLY FORESEEN AND CALCULATED. SECOND, IT WILL BE EASIER TO REACH THE GOAL OF AN AGREED COMMON CEILING AND CONSIDERABLY SIMPLIFY THE NEGOTIATING TASK TO DIVIDE IT IN TWO NEGOTIATING SEGMENTS.

ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL BE APPROACHED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION.

THIS PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS  
AND TO POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS THAT WAS AGREED AMONG US IN THE JUNE  
28 COMMUNIQUE. IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT APPROACH.

THE CONCEPT THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD APPROACH THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH APPROPRIATE PRUDENCE, AND THAT WE SHOULD AGREE  
TO CONDUCT THEM IN A PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE WAY, GIVEN THE  
COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WAS CONTAINED IN THE JUNE  
28 COMMUNIQUE WHICH AMBASSADOR BEHRENS QUOTED TODAY.

FURTHERMORE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT  
TAKE PLACE IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE, AND RESULT IN MORE THAN  
ONE AGREEMENT, EACH ONE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO CONFORM  
WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, WAS ALSO RECOGNIZED  
IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THIS, IN FACT, IS ONE MAJOR SENSE  
OF THE AGREEMENT EMBODIED IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE THAT READS  
"SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT  
IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS  
AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED  
SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY."

IN CONFORMITY WITH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS,  
WE FURTHER PROPOSE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ALSO AGREE,  
DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, ON STABILIZING MEASURES.  
WHEN WE SAY STABILIZING MEASURES, WE MEAN MEASURES AIMED AT ENHANCING  
STABILITY AND BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING FEAR OF  
SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION  
ARISING OUT OF AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY.  
AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF THIS KIND COULD FACILITATE ANY  
SUBSEQUENT

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 24  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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FROM US REP MBFR

NEGOTIATIONS IN THAT IT WOULD TEND TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF GREATER  
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONFIDENCE.

IN ADDITION TO SUCH MEASURES, WE PROPOSE AGREEMENT ON APPROPRIATE  
MEASURES TO VERIFY IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS REACHED AND TO INSURE  
THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED.

WITH REGARD TO THE NATIONALITY OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED, MY  
COLLEAGUES AND I PROPOSE THAT, AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS, THE FIRST PHASE  
CONSIST OF REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE.

THE US, FOR ITS PART, WOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES  
STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A FIRST- PHASE AGREEMENT IN RETURN FOR  
APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THAT AREA. US FORCES

ARE IN THE AREA IN RELATION TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS: THEY COULD BE  
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REDUCED  
IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON ASSOCIATED  
MEASURES  
DESIGNED TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AGREED GOAL OF INCREASED STABILITY WOULD BEST BE  
SERVED BY REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IN OUR VIEW, IT HAS BEEN THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE SOVIET GROUND FORCES  
IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE WHICH HAS BEEN THE ELEMENT OF GREATEST CONCERN AND  
APPREHENSION FOR THOSE IN THE WEST. WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE HERE IN  
ARGUMENTS OVER THE GENESIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION OR OVER INTENTIONS:

INTENTIONS ARE NOT AT ISSUE. WHAT IS AT ISSUE HERE IS CAPABILITY,  
MEASURED IN OBJECTIVE MILITARY TERMS.

TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST WOULD BE FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PROCEED BY THE MOST DIRECT PATH TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND ENHANCE STABILITY. SOVIET AND US GROUND FORCES ARE THE LARGEST COMPONENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. THE PROXIMITY OF THESE FORCES ON SUCH A SCALE IS ONE OF THE MOST POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME SOVIET AND US FORCES AND APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR RETURN TO THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD, THEREFORE, MAKE THE GREATEST INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.

THE US AND SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF THEIR LARGE MILITARY RESOURCES BEAR

A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND FOR FACILITATING THE RELAZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION. THUS, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THE US AND USSR ARE PARTICULARLY CALLED UPON TO TAKE THE FIRST STEO IN REDUCING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

WE WOULD ALSO PROPOSE THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THIS BE CLEARLY REFLECTED IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD COMPLETE THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PHASES TOWARD AN AGREED  
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GOAL

OF A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING FOR THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD AIM AT FURTHER REUDCTIONS IN NATO

AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BEFORE WE MOVE ON TO SUCH A SECOND NEGOTIATING PHASE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD WISH TO ENSURE THAT WE COULD INDEED ACHIEVE A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH ENHANCES SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PROPOSALS WHICH MY GERMAN DOLLEAGUE AND I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY ARE PRACTICAL, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCED STABILITY AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY IN EUROPE. WE SHALL CONTINUE IN SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY MY COLLEAGUES THE PRESENTATION OF FURTHER PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL IMPRESS YOU AS EQUITABLE AND WORKABLE AND LOOK FORWARD TO MUTUAL DISCUSSION OF THEM. END TEXT.HUMES

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